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UNDER THE NEW YORK STATUTE.
m.-&& ....
INTRODUCTION.
It is the purpose of this article to discuss in brief form the
present condition of the Law of Powers in the State of New York,from
an analysis of the Statute and the cases which interpret it; and to
ascertain the more important changes which have been made in the old
Common Law relating to this subject. To carry out this latter
designit has been thought necessary and proper to outline in as
concise a form as possible the prominent features of the old law,
never at any time entering upon a consideration of the intricacies
and nice points of distinction in which the subject abounds.
The following works have been freely used in preparing the
first chapter: Sugden on Powers,Farwell on Powers,Jickling's Analogy




POWERS AT COMMON LAW.
Definition. A Power is defined to be "a right reserved by
a person to himself or given by him to another,to divest land from
those upon whom it is settled by the instrument containing the
Power,and to vest it in others" (a)
In the law of England there were two great classes of Powers,
namely,Common Law Powersand Powers derived from the Statute of
Uses. The were mere declarations or directions opera-
ting only on the consciences of the persons in whom the legal es-
tate was vestedor to whom the power was granted. These were
divided into two sorts: naked powers or bare authorities,and powers
coupled with an interest. Examples of this class of powers would
be,Powers of Attorney or powers to executors to sell an estateto
execute a deed,to make a contractor manage any particular business.
It is with the second class we have to deal in this sketch,a
knowledge of which is indespensable to an intelligible study of the
changes made by the New York Statutes.
These powers are more particularly defined as being "an author-
ity enabling a person through the medium of the Statuteto dispose
of an interest in real property vested in himself or another person,
and said to be a' method of causing a use with its accompanying esta-
te to spring up at the will of a given person"' (b)
(a) Butler's n.to Co.Litt.342,b. (b) Kerr on Real Prop. #1835
2Equitable powers existed before the Statute of Uses,worked out
through the old use then a mere confidence in the person to whom an
estate was conveyed,to dispose of it as the person by whom it was
conveyed should direct. They were introduced in order that
appointments and dispositions in the settlement of estates,might
be made according to the intention of the parties thereto,thereby
avoiding the effect of the strict rules of the Common Law. It was
a
repugnant toAfeoffment at Common Law,that a power should be reser-
ved to revoke the estate grantedyet from the nature of a feoffment
to uses,being a direction how and to whom the feoffee should convey
the estate,there was mo such repugnancy. Hence arose Powers,res-
ervations by the feoffor to uses of the right of declaring at a
future timeto whose use the land should be heldor to whom the feo-
ffee should convey; this right could be broad enough to defeat the
interest of one to whom the present uses were granted and change the
use to another. These powers were,thenin substance,limitations
of contingent uses,the vesting of which were dependent upon the
voluntary acts of a certain person. The Courts of Equity would
compel the feoffee to observe the direction of the feoffor and con-
vey to the appointee.
A consideration for the new use was necessary only when the
inheritance remained in the grantor of the uses,i.e, on a covenant
to stand seized. In all cases where a conveyance operated by
transmutation of possession,as a fine,recovery,feoffment,or lease,
and uses were declared on such conveyance,Hquity did not inquire
3into the consideration: the former owner having divested himself of
the legal estate,it was not necessary to go into Equity as against
him,and the person in whom it was vested being a mere naked trustee,
was bound in conscience to follow the directions of the donor.
Upon the Statute of Uses,as interpreted by the Courts,the whole
modern law of powers is based. The principle effect of this
Statute with reference to powers,was that upon the due execution
of a power and the appointment of the new usethe Statute operated
to execute the useand to vest the legal estate in the possession
of the appointee,divesting the estate of the first grantee,in whom
the statute had previously vested the legal estate. Thus by
virtue of the Statute a legal estate could be revoked,and a new
legal estate created: as,a feoffment to A to the use of B with the
power of revocation and appointment of new uses reserved in the
grantor. The Statute executed the first use,and vested a legal
title in B. of the same nature and quality as his equitable estate
had been,subject to be divested upon the contingency of the execu-
tion of the power. On the appointment of new uses,the estate
of B ceased and a new use arose in the appointee,in whom the Statute
operated to vest the legal title as well. Thus,in brief,the
purpose of the reservation of powers was to enable an estate to be
shifted from one person to another at the will of the one in whom
the power resided,without requiring any other act to be done in the
way of transfer,than the appointment by the holder of the power.
Classification of Powers. Powers are given either to one
who has an estate,present or future,limited to him in the instrument
4creating the poweror who had an estate in the land at the time of
the execution of the deed; or to a stranger to whom no estate is
given,but the power is to be exercised for his own benefit,or to
a mere stranger to whom no estate is givenand the power is for
the benefit of bthers.
The first of these powersare said to be powers relating to
the land,and are divided by Cruise and Jickling into;
(1) Powers appendant,
(2) Powers in gross.
A Power Appendant is where a person has an estate in land with
a power of revocation and appointmentthe execution of which falls
within the compass of and depending strictly upon his estate,attach-
ing upon the interest actually vested in himself. Thuswhere an
estate for life is limited to A with a power to grant leases in
possession; a lease granted under the power may operate wholly out
of the life estateand must have its operation out of his estate
during his life.wholly displacing the life estate,though the lease
may be for a term lasting beyond his own life: or if a person limits
an estate to such uses as he himself shall appoint by his will,and
in the meanwhile to the use of himself and his heirsthe settlor has
a qualified fee,and a power of appointment appendant to his estate.
A Power in Gross--or as classed by Sugden,Powers Collateral--
are powers granted to one who has an interest in the estate either
by the instrument creating the power 3 or already vested in him, the
5execution of which falls wholly without the compass of his iwn es-
tate,i.e. the estate created by the execution of the power is not
to take effect until after the determination of his own estateso
not attaching at all to his interestnor affecting it. As,where
a tenant for life is given a power to appoint the fee after his
death amongst his children,or to create a term of years to commence
from his death.
Both of these are said to be powers coupled with an interest
because the grantee of the powers has an interestnot in the execu-
tion of the power alone~which may not be for his benefitbut as well
in the estate upon which the power depends. A particular powet
may,through a complication of grants in the original deed,fall
within both these classes. In one aspectit may be appendantlin
another,in gross: as,where an estate is settled to A for life rem-
ainder to B in tail,remainder to A in fee,and A is-given a power to
jointure his wife after his death,this power is in gross as to the
estate for life,and appendant as to the estate in fee.
A Power Collateral-or Simply Collateral,Sugden---is that which
is given to a strangerwho has at the time not any interest 1n the
land,and to whom no estate is given. As,a power to X to reveke a
settlementand appoint new uses to other persons designated in the
deed. Before the Statute,the cestui might direct his trustee to
convey as a stranger might appoint. On the passage of the Statute,
it operated on the direction of the stranger and the appointee was
vested with a legal estate..
There was the further distinction between mere powers and pow-
ers in the nature of a trust,commonly called Powers in Trust. "Pow-
ers are never imperative,they leave the act to be done at the will
of the party to whom they are given. Trusts are always impera-
tive and are obligatory upon the conscience of the party intrusted" (a)
It is not necessary in the limits of this discussion to con-
sider further distinctions between the classesnor to touch upon the
rules established by the courts for determining within what class a
given power falls; enough to say that where a duty is imposed upon
the donee to execute,by the requisition of the deed or will,and an
interest is given to him extensive enough to discharge that duty,
the grantee becomes a trustee for the execution of the power,and so
subject to the jurisdiction and supervision of the Courts of Equity.
Creation of Powers. To the valid creation of powersit is
essential that there should be,first,sufficient words to denote the
intention; secondlyan apt instrument,and,thirdly,a proper object.
No technical form of words is necessary,any words will be sufficient
by which an intention to give or reserve a power is clearly mani-
fested,and the scope of the power is designated within a reasonable
degree of certainty. The instrument creating the power may be
either a will or a deed,and if a deed,either in the body,or by en-
dorsement before its execution,or by a separate deed of even date.
Common Law Powers may be inserted in any kind of deed; but powers
opeffating by the Statute of Uses,can be inserted only in conveyances
deriving their effect from the Statute. And in conveyances not
(a) Atty Gen. v Lady DowningWilmot 23.
operating by transmutation of possession,certain powers of appoint-
ment cannot be reserved,unless the appointee be an individual named,
and there be a good consideration; the consideration of blood and
marriage is good within this limitation.
The object of the power may be of any nature,provided the
rules of law or equity are not thereby transgressed. So a power
which violates the rule against perpetuities or remoteness of limi-
tation will be held invalid.
Execution. Powers of revocation and appointment may be
granted,not only to one who by the Common Law is capable of dispos-
ing of an estate actually vested in himself,but also to a married
woman,or an infant. A woman could not alien her own estateex-
cept by fine or recovery; but as the agent of another she could con-
vey an estate in same manner as her principal. For this reason it
has been determined that a feme covert may execute a power,whether
appendanit,in gross,or collateral,and her husband's consent is not
necessary.
An infant,however,could not execute a power over real estate,
other than one simply collateral. Anyonewho~may take lands by
a Common Law conveyance may be an appointee under a power.
It is the general rule that in the execution of the power by
the grantee,every circumstance,required by the instrument creating
the power to accompany ths execution,must be strictly complied with.
The author off the power may surround the execution with as many
solemnities,and direct it to be carried out by such instrument,at
8such times,and with the consent of such persons as he may please.
However.arbitrary and unnecessary the conditions may be,vo1 under
the strict rule of the Common Law,the effect of the slightest depart-
ure will be to render the execution invalid.
The donee has the right in the execution of a power either to
appoint absolutely,or reserving to himself a new power of revocation
and appointment,t~hough such reservation be not expressly authorized
by the instrument creating the power-.
Equitable interference. An execution which is invalid at law
by reason of the failure to comply with all the requirements,will
be aided in Equity in certain cases; the Court interfering to compel
the person,entitled in defaul$ of exec.utionto make good the defect.
The cases wherein.the Court will cure defectivd executions are those
only where there is some natural obligation on the part of the
donee to provide for the persons in whose favor the defective exe-
cution has been made.. These persons are,wife,husband,children,
creditors,and purchasers for a valuable consideration. On the
other handif the donee be under an equal obligation to provide for
the person who would take on default of appointmentEquity will not
interfereunless the heirs or persons so taking are otherwise provid-
ed for. Equity will also relieve against all manner of accident
and fraud,and this even in favor of volunteers.
A non-execution of a power will not be supplied,f or it is
always left to the free-will and election of the donee either to
execute the power or not,and Equity will decline to do for him what
he does not see fit to do for himself. And the intervention of
9death between the donees resolving to execute the powerand his ex-
ecution thereofis not a ground for the interposition of the Court,
although some steps may have been taken toward completing the in-
tention. This rule,it must be remembereddoes not apply to
the non execution of powers in trust.
Effect of Creation and Execution. The estatelimited by
the deed which creates the powers vests in the granteesubject only
to be revoked or defeated by the exercise of the power. When the
power granted is void,the estate will take effect in the same
manner as though, ,he power had not been inserted in the instrument;
so of a power which is given in default of an appointment under a
power void in its creation. It is also held that where an es-
tate limited to take effect in default of the exercise of a prece-
ding power of appointment,the estate so limited will vest in inter-
estand is not merely contingent.
The immediate effect of the proper execution of the power is
that the former uses and estates cease,and a new use springs up to
the appointee which is derived from the seizin of the trustees of
which the Statute transfers the legal estate and the right to poss-
ession. Although the estate created by the execution of the
power owes its commencement to the deed of appointment,the appoint-
ee does not derive his title from the appointor,no out of the
estate whereof the appointor is seized,but acquires it directly from
the conveyance by which the power is created. The appointment
operates by relation from the time when the original conveyance was
executed,just as if the estate created by the appointment,had been
10
actually limited in that conveyance. The right of dower may,
thereforebe cut off by an appointment,but a prior estate created by
the person who executes the power will not be defeated.
In the case of a excessive execution,whether by way of limi-
tation or otherwise,if the Court can see the boundaries so as to
separate the good from the bad,it will uphold the execution pro
tanto,but if the improper excess cannot be distinguished from what
would be a proper execution,the whole appointment will fail. As,
if a power be granted to make leases for twenty one years,and the
donee leases for twenty-five,the execution will be valid as a lease
for twenty-one years and the excess only will be void. On the
6ther hand,if the excess be by way of condition,which is inseparable
from the executionthe whole execution will be rendered void.
Transfer of Powers. When a power is given which reposes a
personal trust and confidence in the donee thereof to exercise his
judgment and discretion,he cannot refer the power to the execution
of another. The rule goes only so far as to forbid delegation of
the confidence and discretion reposed in the donee,so it seems he
may execute the instrument of appointment by attorney,unless pro-
hibited by the donor. And where a power is granted to one and
his assigns,the power will pass with the interest of the donee to
any person who comes to the estate through him;the term "assignee"
including heirs and devisees as well as grantees. Where an
attempted delegation is made it is void because unwarranted,the
estate limited in default of appointment immediately takes effect.
A power might be subject to involuntary transfer by prerogative of
the King,upon attainder of the donee,and the King might execute gor
his own benefit. Creditors had no rights in the power until
execution,but where one had a general power of appointment over an
estate and exercised it,the property appointed formed part of his
assets,so as to be subject to the demands of his creditors in
preference to the claims of his voluntary appointees.
ExtinctionSuspensionand Destruction of Powers. The first
and most obvious mode by which powers,whether relating to the land
or collateral thereto,may be extinguished,is by a complete execution
thereof. Powers relating to the land,whether appendant or in
gross,may be destroyed by a release to any one having an estate in
freeholdin possessionlin remainder,or reversionin the land to
which the power relates. Feoffment of his interest by the Iolder
of a power appendant will bar the power,for the feoffment excludes
the feoffor from any future rights over the land. So too by
any conveyance which derives its effect from the Statute of Uses.
The creation of a particular estate out of the interest ,of the donee
of a power appendant merely suspends the execution of the power
during the continuance of the estate created. Powers in gross,
however,are not barred by a conveyance of the landunless the whole
inheritance is divestedand no seizin is left to feed the uses,
whence the power becomes extinct. Powers collateral cannot be
released,extinguished or destroyed by a conveyance by the donee,for
he has a mere authority and no interest,nor by the act of any other
person.
Finally,a power given to a person having a particular estate
becomes merged by his acquisition of the fee,and where there is no
12
object for the execution of the power it of course ceases.
The yEar Law in New York. Such was the law of powers as
administered in the Mother Country,4evaloped from the doctrine of
family settlements. On this had grown an abstruse sciencewhich
was monopolized by a select body of conveyancerswho had rendered
the subject almost inaccesible to the skill and curiosity of the
profession at large. Chancellor Kent declares these settlements
to be indispensable in opulent communitiesto the convenient dis-
tribution of largd masses of property and to the discreet discharge
of the various duties flowing from the domestic ties;and that the
evils are probably exaggerated by the "zeal and philippics of the
English political and legal reformers". However this may be,the
doctrines were happily almost unknown in practice in this State,
being contrary to our theories of land tenure. But although
the agency of powers with its intricate machinery was seldom used,
yet in every case in which they were met with,the old English Law
must of necessity govern.
Of the Revision the learned Chancellor,brought up inall the
learning of the Egyptians,and familiar with the profundities and
labyrinths of the Common Law,in the interpretation of which he had
become so eminent~says "The Revision contains the most extensive
innovation which has hitherto been the consequence of any single
legislative effort upon the Common Law of the land... . .The learni
concerning real property .... appears to be too abstract and too
complicated to admit with entire safety of the compression which
has been attempted by a brief,pity,sententious style of composition.
13
Brevity becomes obscurity and a good deal of circumlocution has
heretofore been indulged in all legislative production ... When the
Revisers -proposed to abolish Powers as they now exist,and substitute
another system in their stead,they undoubtedly assumed the task of
vast and perilous magnitude".
The work of the Revisers and its effectswe propose to con-
sider in the succeeding chapter.
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CHAPTER II
THE NEW YORK STATUTE OF POWERS.
The Revision and its Purposes. The Statute of New York
defining and regulating the whole subject of POWERS was submitted to
a special session of the legislature on September nintheighteen hun
dred and twenty-eight,by the Statutory Revision Committee--then
composed of Messrs Duer,Butler and Spencer. The Statute was
passed as submitted,and went into effect January firsteighteen
hundred and thirty,as Article three of Chapter one of Part two of
the Revised Statutes. By its provisions all existing powers
relating to land,other than powers of attorney,were abolishedand
specific,detailed regulations prescribed for the creation,construc-
tion,and execution of powers in the future.
The reasons given by the Revisers for the sweeping changes
made in this branch of the law are stated at large in their report
on this Article.(a) -- "The law of powers,as all who have attempted
to master it will readily admit is probably the most intricate laby-
rinth in all our jurisprudence.....We encounter this darkness at
the very threshold of our enquiries,as the division or classifi-
cation of powers seems industrtously framed to confound all intelli-
gence of their meaning and utility". This criticism seem
merely
however rather harsh. They continue --"Nor is itAbecause it is
(a) See Appendix,Vol.3,Ed.JIev.Stat.p.588 et seq.
mysterious and complex that a reform in this part of the law is
desirable. It is liable to still more serious objections since
....... 0it affords the ready means of evading the most salutary
provisions of our statutes. It avoids all the formalities
wisely required in the execution of deeds and wills,frustrates the
protection meant to be given to creditors and purchasersand eludes
nearly all the checks by which secrecy and fraud in the alienation
of lands are sought to be prevented". Speaking of the old
classification they say,"It is a striking error in this classifi-
cation that it overlooks entirely the nature and objects of the
power itselfand regards solely the connection between the party
exercising the power and the lands it embraces. Yet it is ob-
vious that the character and consequently the construction and
execution of the power may be the same whether it is vested in an
owner or a stranger; or is to take effect out of a present or a
future estate. .... It is from this arbitrary classification
that rules equally arbitrary have been derived,rules which are first
established at Common Law and then by an ordinary process evaded in
Chancery,.......We propose therefore,an entirely new division of
powers,not merely expressed in terms which at once suggest the
reason for their adoptionbut because it rests upon substantial and
practical distinctions".
Abolition of Existing Powers. The first section of the
Article on Powers (a) abolishes powers as they existed on the thirty
(a) Now comprising Art.4 of Chap.46 of the General Laws,hereinafter
designated as R.P.L.
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first day of December eighteen hundred and twenty-nineand declares
that henceforth the only powers permitted to be granted are those
enumerated in the Article. It was the intention of the Legislat-
ure to make this Article a complete and exhaustive code on the sub-
ject; and so thoroughly did the Statute eradicate the old system
that it is now held that the only key to the construction of the
Statute is to be found within the Article,and the Commnon Law is no
longer applicable even in a judicial constructiontthough it was once
said that the revision substantially followed and adopted the rules
of the Common Lawdeparting therefrom only to remove doubts and
secure greater accuracy and precision.
Definitions. The Statute defines a Power as "An authority
to do an act in relation to real property or to the creation or
revocation of an estate therein or a charge thereon which the owner
grantingA the power might himself lawfully perform. (a)
The Statute is far from defining all the purposes for which a
power may be created,no: could it without prescribing all the uses
and purposes to which property may lawfully be put. It recog-
nizes the existence of powers of appointment and revocation which
were well known to the Common Law. The test of the validity is
found in the nature of the act to be done under the power,and this
may be any act which,as the Statute says,the creator of the power
might himself do. (b)
Section one hundred and twelve of the Real Property Law defines
(a) R.P.L.#lll (b) Jennings v Conboy,75 N.Y. 230, Cutting v
Cutting,86 N.Y.522. Delaney v McCormack 88 N.Y.174.
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the parties to the creation of a power "The word 'grantor' is used
in this Article in connection with a power,as designating the person
by whom the power is created,whether by grant oa devise; and the
word 'grantee' is so used as designating ther person in whom the
power is vested whether by granti,:devise br reservation".
Division of Powers. The Revisers abandoned the old classi-
fication and proposed a novel division testing on substantial and
practical distinctions looking to the extent of the powers and the
objects they are meant to attain; whether the power is to be exer-
cised by the grantee for his own benefit,or for the benefit of others
The logical classification was therefore into; General or Special:-
and Beneficial or In Trust (a)
The first relates to the extent of the power. -"A power is
general where it authorizes the transfer or encumbrance of a fee,by
either a conveyance or a will of or a charge on the property em-
braced in the power to any grantee whatever". (b)
A power is Special where either:
1. The-. persons or class of persons to whom the dispos-
ition of the property under the power is to be made are designated;
2. The power authorizes the transfer,by a conveyance,
will or charge,of an estate less than a fee. (c)
The second division has to do with the nature of the power as
affecting the parties thereto. A power is Beneficial,whether
general or special,when the grantee alone is interested in the
according to the terms of the creation. Cd)
(aT7R.P. QFR'I .P b- .P.L.#jT4.(C-&--1. L. 115 .C-d) .P. L.116.
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Beneficial Powers have 'or their object the grantee thereof,
and are to be executed solely for his benefit. The words "by its
terms" do not mean however,that the grantee must be specifically
pointed out and in so many words be given an interest in the power.
Although an object is as requisite to the creation of. a power under
the Statute as at Common Law,there is nothing in the Statute which
requires the object to be in terms specified in the instrument
tcreating the power. It is not provided that the instrument shall
specify affirmatively what shall be done with the proceeds of the
sale or who shall be benefited by the execution. So,where a
power is granted and no direction is given to distribute the pro-
ceeds among othersthe inference is that they shall rest where the
sale leaves them; if no one else is declared to be the beneficiary,
they remain with the donee. This construction does not deprive
the expression "by the terms of its creation" of all meaning; it
merely excludes any other -wa* of acquiring an interest in the
execution of a power than by virtue of the instrument creating it(a)
A general power to. dispose by devise is held to be beneficial,
though the grantee himself cannot derive any benefit thereform,where
there is none other interested in the execution. (b)
Powers In Trust. "A general power is in trustwhere any per-
son or class of persons,other than the grantee of the power is
designated as entitled to the proceeds,or other benefits to result
from its execution." (c)
(a) Jennings v Conboy,(Supra), Cutting v Cutting (supra)
(b) Hume v RandalIL,141 N.Y. 499 Cc) R.P.L. #117.
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A Special Power is in trust where either:
1. The disposition or charge which it authorizes is limited
to be made to a person or class of persons,other than the grantee of
the power; or,
2. A person or class of persons,other than the grantee,is
designated as entitled to any benefit,from the disposition or
charge authorized by the power. (a)
The definition of a power in trust will serve to distinguish
that class of powers from those which are beneficial. A power in
trust hashowevermany of the features of an estate in trust,being
often nothing more than an attempted active trust which has failed
to come within the Statute of Trusts.
The likeness and difference were well pointed out in the
case of Farmers Loan & Trust Company v Carroll (b) -"A power in
trust is to be in contradistinction to an estate in
trust. The former is a mere authorityor right to limit a use,
while the latter is an estate or interest in the subject. A trustee
is always vested with the legal estate,but this is not necessary
with respect to the donee of a power. In the case of a power in
trust there is always a person other than the grantee or donee of
the power,which person is called the appointee,answering to the
cestui que trust in a simple trust. The provisions of the Stat-
ute show that in all cases of a power in trust an appointee or
beneficiary other than the grantee of the power is contemplated.
It is as necessary an ingredient in the power in trust,as a cestui
que trust in the case or a conveyance or devise in trust.
(a) R.P.L.#118. (b) 5 Barb,,6b2
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A power in trust involves the idea of a trust as much as a
trust estate. In both cases a confidence is implied. The diff-
erence is-in the mode of effectuating the object. In one case
it is done through a conveyance or devise of an estate in trust by
which the grantee or trustee becomes seized of the legal estate in
the land; in the other by the creation or grant of a power by which
the donee is invested with an authority in relation to the future
use or disposition of the land" So also in analogy to a trust the
beneficiaries must be definiteascertained persons,who can come into
Court and say that they are the ones for whose benefit the power
has been granted. Therefore,when the selection of the beneficiar-
ies is wholly within the will of the grantee there can be no power
in trust (a)
The instrument creating the power need not in so many words
declare that it is to be executed for the benefit of A,Bor C; asif
land be granted to Xin trust for A.B.and C. with power to sell,but
the grant being silent as to the disposition of the proceeds of
such sale,the beneficial interest is conferred by necessary impli-
cation on A,B and C (b) A testator gave all the residue of
his estate to his children,giving to the executors a power to sell
all or any part of the real estate in their discretionbut with no
direction as to the disposition of the proceeds. This was held to
be a power in trust,and the devisees to whnom the land was given were
the beneficiaries. (c)
(a) Read v WilJliams,125 N.Y.560. Tilden v Green 130 N.Y.29
(b) Syracuse Bank v Porter,36 Hun 168 . (c) Kinnear v Rogers 42 N.Y.55
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The grantor himself may be the beneficiary. As a grant of a
power to X to sell and convey lands and pay the proceeds to the
grantor during his lifeand to distribute the residue as the grantor
should direct(a). While the grantee cannot be the sole beneficiary
in a power in trusthe may be one of several; but if lands be al-
ready devised to him in partthe power as to his share becomes
merged in the fee (b).
It will be noticed that the language of the Statute in the
first sub-division of the section,defining special powers in trust,
is practically the same as the first sub-division of the section
defining special powers. A special power of the first class,i.e.
where t1epersons to whom the disposition is to be made are desig-
nated,is always a power in trust. The only class of special
powers which are beneficial are those of the second class,i.e.powers
to convey an estate less than a fee.
CREATION OF POWERS
Parties. The Statute declares that no person is capable of
granting a power who is not at the same time capable of transferring
an interest in the property to which the power relates;(c) -and that
a power may be vested in any person capable of holdingbut cannot
be exercised by a person not capable of transferring real propertyo(d)
It was provided by the Revised Statutes at the time of their
passage,when married women were under disabilities &s to the aliena-
tion of their real property,that a general and beneficial power may
be granted to a married woman to dispose,during her marriage,and
'fa) Fellows v Hermans,4 Lansing 230. (b) Heitzell v Barber 69 N.Y.l
(c) R.PL.,#119. [d) R.P.L#121
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without the concurrence of her husband,of land conveyed to her in
fee,--being simply a power to make disposition of her own property
in a manner which avoided the restrictions of the Common Law. Later
sections granted to married women,as an exception to the rule con-
cerning capacity required for execution,the right to exercise a
power during her marriage and without the consent of her husband1
unless by the terms of the power the execution was prohibited
during marriage,and with the restriction that the power could not be
exercised during the minority of such married woman.(a)
These sections were held to be enabling and not restrictiveand
by them the disability of coverture was,so far as respects the
execution of powers,completely swept ',away; (b) except that a
woman could not by means of a power convey directly to her husband
by appobnting to his use (c),but might mortgage her lands as
security for his debts(d).
Although some of these sections still remain in the present
Statute,it would seem that the necessity for all special enabling
acts has now passed away.
The only practical restriction now existing on the right to
create or execute powers is upon those actually incapable of con-
veying land,and upon aliens and corporations whose right to hold and
dispose of real property is entirely contro2lled by statutes which
relate to those subjects Ce)
(a) R.S.# 110,111. (b) Wright v Tallmadge 15 N.Y.307
(c) Dempsey v Yylee,3 Duer 73. Cd) Leavitt v Pell 25 N.Y.474.
Ce) Ludlow v VanNess 8 Bosw.178
A grantor of real property has the same right to reserve powers
to himself,either beneficial or in trustwhich he might grant to
another. (a)
How Granted. A special power may be granted either:
1.By a suitable clause contained in an instrument suffi-
cient to pass an estate in the real property to which the power
relates; or
2. By a detise contained in a will. (b)
No formal set of words is requisite to create or reserve a
power. It is sufficient if the intention be clearly declared,or
appear by necessary implication. The language is to be construed
equitably and liberally in futherance of the grantor's intention#o(c)
Sowhere a testator gave his wife "all my real and personal estate,
du:ting her life-time",and at her death whatever whould remain,to
be divided among his heirs,it was held that the testator expressed
the clear intention that the widow should have the full enjoyment
of the estate during her lifewith a view to her support and main-
tenance,and that this gave her a power of disposition controlled
in its exercise by the purposes for which the estate was given to
her. (d).
Until the passage of the Real Property Law the language of
the first subdivision "by a suitable clause contained in a convey-
ance of some estate in the land"Etc. This was construed so that
it was not necessary that an estate in the land should be granted to
the donee. The instrument by which the power was created or reserved
(a) R.P.L.#124. (b) R.P.L.#120. (c) Dorland v Dorland 2 Barb. 63.
Cd) Thomas v Wolf ord 49 Hun,145, Colt v Heard 10 Hun,189
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need not be in and of itself a conveyance of any titleso where the
grantor attempted to create a trust,but failing,&nd the title still
remaining in himself,yet if it came within the provisions of the
Statute of Trusts (a) the invalid trust would be valid as a power.
In which case the grantee held a power merely,without any estate in
the land (b). Nor need the grant of the power be contained in
the same instrument as the conveyance of the land,but might be
created by a separate deed which would be considered as constituting
a part of one entire transaction.(c) The Real Property Law c
obviates all questions on this point,by providing that the instru-
ment creating or reserving the power shall be such an one as woild
be sufficient to pass an interest in real estate i.e. an instrument
of like nature to a conveyance of land.
The creation of powers is also governed by Section 207 of the
Real Property Law,which requires a writing for the "creation,grantigg
assigning,Etc. of any trust or power over or concerning real prop-
erty".
The right to create special and beneficial powers is limited
by section 123 of the Real Property Law to the following cases:
1. To a married woman to dispose,during the marriage,of
any estate less than a fee belonging to her in the property to which
the power relates.--This is a complement to the power to dispose of
a fee in lands which he owns ,given, in section .112.
2. To a tenant for life, of the real property embraced
(a) R.P.L.#77 (b) Fellows v Heermans (supra) (c) Hubbard v Gilbert
25 Hun 596. Selden v Vermilyea,2 Sand. S.C. 568.
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in the power,to make leases for not more than twenty-one years,and
to commence in possession during his life; and such power is valid
to authorize a lease for that period,but is void as to the excess."
"At Common Law,leases for any term could be authorized by powers
and an indefinite power of leasing would permit the granting of
leases for any period however long,and which might begin either
within the life estate or upon the death of the life tenant who had
the power. Under the section as it stood in the Revised Statuteq
not then containing the last clause,it was held that a power to
lease for a longer term was valid so far only as to permit leases
for twenty-one years. The leasing being not imperative,but
optionalbeeause beneficial,there was nothing to preclude the exe-
cution according to the statutory limit. So a power to lease for
any period not exceeding sixty-three years,was held not void in its
creation,was because it might be executed in a manner consistent
with the Statute. But a power which authorized leases to be
made for a longer period than twenty-one years,and not otherwise,
would be voidbecause impossiblp of execution within the terms of
the Statute (a) . The clause in the present section has the
effect of making this decision a part of the Statute law.
ABSOLUTE POWER OF ALIENATION.
The Common Law did not treat a general and special power as
property,so that i a donee of such a power should die without
having executed it,the creditors were without a remedy against the
(a) Root v Stuyvesant,18 Wend.257.
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land to which the power related; but if he should execute the power
in favor. of a volunteer and presently die,the appointee was consider"
ed in Equity a trustee for the creditors. So by means of a power
of revocation one might retain to himself the absolute dominion
over his estatethough in form conveying it to another,and place it
beyond the reachiboth of his own creditors and the creditors of
the grantee.
The Revisers rightly considered that the absolute power of
disposition over landsought in most cases to be treated as the
highest form of property,and to carry a fee to the grantee of such
plenary beneficial power. They say "that a change in the existing
law is here not merely proper,but necessarywill be admitted by
all ..... In reason and good sense,there is no distinction between
the absolute power of disposition and the absolute ownership,and
to make such distinction to the injury of creditors may be consis-
tent with technical rules,but is a flagrant breach of the plainest
maxims of-Equity and Justice. There is a moral obligation on
every man to apply his property to the payment of debts;ar the law
becomes an engine of fraud,when it permits this obligation to be
evadid by a verbal distinction. It is an affront to common' sense
to say that a man has no property in that which he may sell when he
chooses,and dispose of the proceeds at his pleasure."
In accordance with these views,it was enacted that when the
absolute power of disposition is given to the owner of a particular
estate ,when not accompanied by any trust,such grantee takes the fee
subject~1to the futute estates limited thereon in default of executio. 3
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but absolute with respect to the right of creditors,purchasers,and
incumbrancer:. So also where there is no remainder limited on the
estate of the grantee (a).
An absolute power of disposition is defined to be where a
general anibeneficial power to devise is given to a tenant for life
or for years,or where the grantee is enabled in his life time to
dispose of the entire fee for his own benefit(b). Also where
the grantor in a conveyance reserves a power of revocation for his
own benefit,he is still deemed the absolute owner so far as the
rights of creditors and purchasers are concerned (c).
It will be noticed that the power to dispose during life is
turned into a fee whether the grantee has a particular estate in the
land or is a stranger; but in case of a power to ddvise,such power
is made a fee only when given to,"a tenant for life or for years",
so that when the power to dispose by will is given to one vho has
no legal interest in the land other than the power,the fee is not
considered to be vested in him;as where a beneficiary of a trust
estate is given power to appoint to the legal estate by will ,his
estate is not,by'the grant to him of the power,made subject to the
claims of creditors (b).
The Statute,being within itself a complete code of the law of
powers~has abrogated the rules of English Courts of Equity in rela-
tion thereto,placing the doctrines concerning the rights of credi-
tors on a more rational basis,and in no case not therein provided
(a) # 129,130,131,R.P.L. (b) # 152,133,R.P.L. (c) # 125 R.P.L.
C(d) Cutting v Cutting, (supra) Genet v Hunt 113 N.Y.158,Crooke v
0oof Kings,97 N.Y.421.
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for will the old rules apply,so if there are any powers which the
Statute does not render liable to creditors before execution,Equity
will not make them so after execution. The provisions as to the
absolute power of disposition apply to cases where such power is
given by law, As,where a treaty between the United States and
Wurtemburg provided that on the death of any person holding real
property in one country which would descend to citizens of the
other if they were not disqualified by alienage,such subject should
be allowed a term of two years within which to sell the property,
it was held that they would become absolute owrers during the
prescribed period and might enjoy the rents and profits. (a)
EXECUTION OF POWERS.
The Statute has provided with great fulness for the execution
of pPwers,changing in many particulars the rules of the Common Law.
We have seen that a valid execution at Common Law required the
most strict observance of all the formalities prescribed by the
grantor thereof,whether serving any useful purpose as a safeguard
to the rights of parties interestedor entirely unnecessary and use-
less. Moreover,the strictness of the Common Law in requiring the
compliance with the most idle and trifling forms and conditions is
little less remarkable than the liberality of Equity to dispense
with even the most necessary,in the exercise of its jurisdiction in
aid of defective execution. The Statute-having always in..
(a) Kull v Kull,37 Hun.476.
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contemplation the true purpose of powers,namely,the doing of some
act in relation to lands,which the owner might do- requires that
powers be executed "by a written instrument sufficient to pass the
estate or interest intended to pass under the poW,if the person
executing the power were the true owner",(a) thus placing the
grantee in the shoes of the grantor for the purpose of execution.
The instrument by which the power may be executed is thBefore sub-
ject to all the provisions of statutes which relate to the creation
or transferring of estates in land whether by deed or by will.
The directions of the grantor,as to the mode of execution must
be literally complied with; so if he grants the power to dispose by
will,the disposition must be by will,and if by deed,then by deed
alone.(b) Where,Phowever, a general power to dispose is given
without expressly or impliedly declaring the mode of its execution,
it may be executed either by will or deed.(c)
Needless formalities,directed to be observed by the grantor,
may be dispended with,and only those necessary to the proper con-
veyance of the estate carried out. And conditions merely nominal
may be whoIly disregarded in the execution. (d)
The grantor may impose conditions upon the performance .f which
the execution depends. These must be strictly complied with to
render the execution valid. The requirement that the grantor or
some third person shall give his consent to the execution is such
a condition. It is designed to guard against a sale without his
personal sanction,and is therefore more than a nominal formality,
(a) #145 R.F.L. (b) # 147,148,R.P.L. (c) Matter of Gardiner,
140 N.Y.122, Am.Home Miss.Soc. v Wadham 10 Barb.597
,(d) # 150,151 R.P.L.
30
but essential,and such consent must be had to validate the disposi-
-tion (a). The Statute provides that such consent shall be ex-
pressed in the instrument by which the power is executed,or in a
written certificate thereon "and to entitle the instrument to be
recorded,such signature must be acknowledged or proved and certified
in like manner as a deed to be recorded" (b) The signature ola
certificate is the evidence of the consentand the consent itself
may be given by an acceptance of the land by the third person and
a subsequent sale by him; in which case he may be compelled to com-
plete the defective execution by making a certificate of such con-
sent. (c). Where such consent is made a condition precedent and
the person whose consent is necessary dies before executionthe
power fails and cannot thereafter .be exercised; and tnder the old
Revised statutes,when the joint consent of several was required,the
power would be extinguished by the death of one. This was remg-
died by the Real Property Law which makes the consent of the sur-
vivor sugficient unless otherwise prescribed in the grant of the
power (d). It is further provided that,"the intention of the
grantor of a power,as to the manner,time and condition of its
execution,must be observed,sibject to the power of the Supreme
Court to supply a defective execution as provided in this article'(e)
Where the grantor provides that the power shall not be exercised
before a ertain time,or within certain limits,an execution at any
other period than that permitted will be invalid; and in any case
Ca) Kissam v Dierkes,49 N.Y.602, Cb) # 153,R.P.L. Cc) Barber v Cary
11 N.Y.397. Cd) #154 R.P.L. Ce) #152 R.P.L.
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where the grantor has imposed valid conditions precedent,the power
may not be exercised until the literal happening of the event,and
the purchaser or appointee must ascertain at his peril that the
conditions have been fulfilled. Where the conditions are sub-
sequent,as a provision for the disposition of the proceeds of a
sale,the purchaser is relieved of any obligation to see to thbir
application (a). Hoi-,everwhen the performance of a condition
precedent has become impossible and the general scheme of the power
requires the execution even after the impossibility arisesthe
condition may be disregarded; as,where a power of sale is given to
executors by a testatrix during the life of her husband and with
his consent,but the plan of the will required a sale to be made
after he had died,the consent was held to be a condition precedent
during his life.from which the power was freed after his death. (b)
The execution of the power must conform to the conditions of the
grant,as to the nature of the estate or interest conveyed to the
appointee. So where a power to appoint an estate among children
of the grantee was given to a life tenan ,it was not well executed
by an appbintment to the children for life and remainder to their
issue. (c)
Judicial Control over Execution. The equitable jurisdiction
of the Courts with reference to any interference in the execution
of powers is with few exceptions confined to powers in trust.
The Statute declares that,"a trust power,unless its execution or
(a) Griswold v Pertry,7 Lans.98. (b) Chatfield v Simonson,92 N.Y.199.
(c) Stuyvesant v Neil 67 H{ow.Fr- 16.
32
non-execution is made expressly to depend on the will of the grantee,
is imperative and imposes a duty on the granteethe performance of
which may be compelled for the benefit of the persons interested. A
trust power does not cease to be imperative when the grantee has the
right to select any and exclude others of the persons designated as
the beneficiaries of the trust". (a) In every case whwre there is a
duty on the part of a grantee to perform the trust,the execution may
be compelledthe test of the duty being whether the execution is to
depend entirely on the vblition of the grantee. rnhe only difficulty
arises in cases in which it may be uncertain from the language of the
deed creating the power,whether the execution is discretionary or not.
It is usually considered imperative when the subject and the object
are certain,as in cases of trust; as where the authority is clearly
given the beneficiaries are distinctly designated,and there is no
express declaration in the deed confiding the execution to the dis-
cretion of the grantee. The imperative nature of a trust power is
not destroyed because the language is permissive. If the disposing
power is given and is not coupled with words which expressly make
the grantee the final arbiter of its exercise,then it is imperative.
Some positive expression of an intention to make the ultimate convey-
ance of the property depend upon the volition of the grantee must be
found,or there must be annexed to the power some qualification,plainly
indicating that the grantor has substituted the judgment of the grantee
ffor his own,f or the purpose of determining whether the authorized
disposition shall eventually be made. A full and unrestrained
(a) #137 R.P.L.
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authority to dispose has always been deemed sufficient to impress
the power with a trust which imposes a duty on the grateee of exe-
cuting it. Words of mere authority in a will are,in a Court of
Equity,mandatory,aswhere a testator gave lands to his son "with the
right and privilege of disposing of the same by will or devise to
his children" the power was held imperative (a) On the other
hand,a simple reservation by a grantor of the power to appoint a
life estate to his wife,was held to be purely discretionary (b).
Whenever the power is imperative the beneficiary may bring action
in the Supreme Court to compel its execution for his benefit. The
jurisdiction extends also to adjudging the execution when the
trustee has diedor where a power is created by will and no grantee
thereof has been named by the testator. (c) Although the Court
may compel or supervise the execution,(d) it has no power to divest
the grantee of the power and vest it in another on the failure or
refusal to executenor can it hamper the action of the grantee by
the imposition of a bond as security for the proper performance. (e)
When the terms of the power import that the estate,or the fund
derived therefrom,is to be distributed among the persons designated
in such manner as the grantee thinks proper,he may allot the whole
to anyonne or more of such persons,to the exclusion of all the
(a) Smith v Floyd,140 N.Y.337, (b) Towler v Towler,142 N.Y.371.
(c) #140,141 R.P.IJ. Cd) Delaney v McCormack 88 N.Y.182
(e) lanBoskerck v Herrick, 65 Barb.250.
others. (a) . This clause was proposed by the Revisers to
prevent the interference of Equity in correcting illusory appoint-
mentsa jurisdiction which they call very questionable in itselff
and whose limits are uncertain. It is provided,however,that in
case the grantee has no right of selection as to the appointees or
the amounts to be given to each,and where no specification as to
such amounts is made in the power,or where a grantee with the right
of selection dies without having executed it,all the appointees
shall be entitled equally. (U)
The Court will interfere to aid the defective execution of a
trust power;(c) and where the interest of the beneficiary is assign-
able,will compel the execution for the benefit of creditors (c).
The only jurisdiction to enforce a beneficial power is that
given in section 139,by which a special and beneficial power is made
liable to creditors,for whose benefit execution may be decreed.
The creditors to be entitled to execution must stand in that rela-
tion to the granteeand not to the grantor.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF POWERS.
The Statute makes not a few changes in the law relating to the
extinguishment of powers. The rules of the Common Law were
based on the extent of the power and its connection with the land,
in absolute disregard of the distinction between beneficial and
trust powers. The Statute carefully preserves this distinction,
and bases the rule of the survival of trust powers on the doctrine
(a) #138 R.P.L. (b) #138,140. R.P.L. (c) #143 R.P.L. Cd) #142
R.P.L.
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that Equity will not suffer a trust to fail by the death or miSCon-
duct of a trustee,applying to powers in trust,so far as analogous,
the rules which govern trust estates. The Statute therefore
provided that in case the grantee of a power in trust "dies leaving
the power unexecutedthe execution must be adjudged for the benefit,
equally,of all the persons designated as beneficiaries of the trust".()
So also the death of one or more of several joint grantees in trust
will not extinguish the power but it may be executed by the survivor
or survivors.
All powers determine when the purposes thereof have been accom-
plished.(b) So also where thy have become unattainableas if the
object should cease to exist or the time during which the power was
to live had expired,or the purpose of the power is contrary to law
or good morals.(c) A power of any class,which can be exercised
only with the consent of the grantor or the third person,will cease
on the death of that person,unless it is the intention of the grant-
or that after the death of such person,it may be exercised without
such consent. (d) Beneficial powers,simply collateral,remain
practically as under the old law,and cannot be extinguished by any
act of the grantee (e). As to beneficial powers of the sort,
formerly denominated"appendant " or "in gross",important changes
have also been made. By the Common Law powers appendant were
held to be destroyed by the alienation og the estate by the grantee,
and even by the execution of a mortgage. To guard against this
latter inconvenience,and to give the mortgagee the benefit of the
(a) #l40,R.P.L. (b) Hutchings v Baldwin 7 Bos.231. (c) Sharpsteen
v Tillou,3 Cow.651,McCarty v Terry,7 Lans.236. (d) Kissam v Dierkes
(supra) (e) Learned v Tallmadge 26 Barb.443.
36
power as further securitythe Statute provides that a mortgage of k
the estate by a tenant for life shall not suspend the power to make
leases,"but the power is bound by the mortgage in the same manner
as the real property embraced therein,and the effects on the power
of such lien by mortgage are:
1. That the mortgagee is entitled to an execution of the
power so far as the satisfaction of his debt requires; and
2. That every subsequent estate(created by the owner in
execution of the power becomes subject to the mortgage,as if in
terms embraced therein"(a).
So,too,the grant of his estate by a life tenant will carry
with it a power to grant leases,unless it be specifically excepted,
and if so excepted it is extinguished; and such power may be extin-
guished by a release by the life tenant to one entitled to an ex-
pectant estate in the property(b). A beneficial power will of
course determine upon the death of the grantee leaving it unexecuted
and will become merged if the grantee acquires the fee in the land
to which the power relates(c). A purchaser under a power
buys at his peril. He is bound to enquire whether the power has
been extinguished before the attempted execution(d).
MISCEl OUS PROVISIONS.
Power as a Lien. Section 127 provides that,~apwri
lien or charge on the real property which it embraces,as against
creditors,purchasers,and incumbrancers in good faith and without
notice,of or from a person having an estate in the property only
(a) #136 R.P.1L. (b) #135 R.P.L. (c) Hutchings v Baidwin (supra)
,Heitzel v Barber 69 #.Y.1 (d) Stafford v Williams 12 Barb.240
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from the time the instriument containing the power is duly recorded.
As against all other persons,the power is a lien from the time the
instrument in which it is contained takes effect."
We have already seen that the instrument containing the power
must be in such form as to enable it to be recorded in conformity
to the Recording Actand in part this section declares the effect
of the recording. The section was designed to protect those.
persons who,with respect to the property,stand in an analogous posi-
tion to that of purchasers and creditors in good faith and without
notice,as a creditor who has loaned money or given credit to the
debtor upon the r'epresentations or reasonable assumption that the
property belonged to the heir or devisee. Such persons taking
from the heir or devissee before the recording of the power will
take the land free from the lien of the power,which cannot thereafter
be executed to their damage.(a) Wherehowever,the devisee
assumes to sell to one,who has notice of the existence thereof or is
a volunteerthe power is a lien from the time of its creation,and
the grantee will not have clear title(b).
Suspension of Power of Alienation. "The period during which
the absolute power of alienation may be suspended by an instrument
in execution -of a powermust be computednot from the date of such
instrument,but from the time of the creation of the power".(c) The
instrument in execution of the power is not regarded as an alien-
ation by the grantee,but as an act of the grantor. The deed given
(a) rennet v Rosenthai,ll Daly 91. Jackson v Davenport 20 Johns 537
(b) Heitzell v Barber 6 Hun. 534. Cc) #158 R.P.L.
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by the grantee relates back to the creation of the power,and for the
purpose of this section the time of the suspension of Alienation
begins to run at the creation of the power. Sowhere a life tenant
in the execution of a power to devise in in feecreated a life es-
tate to begin upon his death,with contingent limitations in fee
which might not vest in possession during the life estate,the exe-
cution was held to be void,because the vesting of the fee might be
postponed beyond two lives in being,counting from the creation of
the first life estate; and this estate was held to be vested in
those to whom it was limited in default of execution (a). It
seemsan imperativeapower of sale will suspend the power of aliena-
tion,(b) but a discretionary power will not have this effect (c).
Where a power is given by will to appoint an estate,the execution
also relates back to the will,as the source of the estate appointed,
within the meaning of the Collateral Inheritance Tax Lawwhich
taxes conveyances by willand upon the appointmentthe estate will
be appraised and assessed as though given directly and immediately
by the will (d).
Further sections place instruments in the execution of powers
on the same footing as conveyances and wills so far as the effect
of fraud therein is concerned;(e),and on the same-footing as actual
conveyances by the owner when the rights of a purchaser for value
are involved by reason of defective execution (f).
(a) Dana v Murray 122 N.Y.604. (b) Delafield vShipman 103 N.Y.463
Cc) Blanchard V Blanchard,4 Hun 287. Cd) Matter of Stewart 131 N.Y.
274. Ce) #161 R.P.L. (f) #160 R.P.L.
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Finally,to assimilate trust powers more nearly with trust est-
ates for the purpose of their judicial supervision,the Statute pro-
vides that certain sections(a) of the Statute of Trustswhich con-
cern the management of the trust estate,and the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court relating to the removal and appointment of trustees
and the vesting of the trust in the Court,shall apply equally to
trust powers.
A full consideration of the law relating to powers of sale
given to executorstogether with the doctrines of conversionelec-
tion Etceach opening a broad field of law,have been omitted here-
from,being quite beyond the scope of this sketch.
CONCLUSION.
Such was the work of the Revisers. To the success of their
labors time has given its testimony. The law as they framed it
has remained almost unaltered to this day;the changes made by the
last revision being,in most instancesverbal merely. That the
apprehensions of Chancellor Kent and the other Black letter lawyers
of the older school have failed to be realizedis proven by the
dearth of reports of cases wherein it has been necessary to subject
the clear,explicitand unambiguous language employed by the Revisers
to a judicial interpretation. As was said by Chief-Justice Sava-
ge in the leading case of Lorillard v Coster (b); in the effort
"to extricate this branch of the law from the perplexity and ob-
scurity in which it was before involved,they have certainly succeeddct
(a) #91,92,93,R.P.L. (b) 14 Wend.265.
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to a very great extent if not entirely ..... Instead of endeavor-
ing to unravel the mysteries of uses and trusts,or to cast light
into the numerous dark and winding passages of the labyrinth of
powersthey demolish the whole. The learned antiquarian will
pause and wonder over this pile of ruiris,venerable,at least,for
their antiquity,the erection of which occupied centuries and put
in requisition the labors of kings,ecclesiastics and laymen. Upon
these runis have been erected new edificesa new system of uses and
trusts apparently plain and intelligible and adapted to the real
wants of Society. . .*... Instead of the labyrinth of powers we
have a new building of modefn architecture through which I hope we
may pass with safety,with such clues as the Revisers have furnished"
